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ASSESSMENT OF EXTENT AND DEGREE OF THERMAL DAMAGE 
TO POLYMERIC MATERIALS IN THE THREE MILE ISLAND 
UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING 
ABSTRACT 
Thermal damage to susceptible materials in accessible regions of the 
TMI-2 reactor building shows damage-distribution patterns that indicate 
non-uniform Intensity of exposure. No clear explanation for non-uniformity Is 
found in existing evidence; e.g., in some regions a lack of thermally 
susceptible materials frustrates analysis. Elsewhere, burned materials are 
present next to materials that seem similar but appear unscathed—leading to 
conjecture that the latter materials preferentially absorb water vapor during 
periods of high local steam concentration. Most of the polar crane pendant 
shows heavy burns on one half of its circumferential surface. This evidence 
suggests that the polar crane pendant side that experienced heaviest burn 
damage was exposed to intense radiant energy from a transient fire plume in 
the reactor containment volume. Tests and simple heat-transfer calculations 
based on pressure and temperature records from the accident show that the 
atmosphere inside the reactor building was probably 8% hydrogen 1n air^ a 
value not inconsistent with the extent of burn damage. 
Burn-pattern geography indicates uniform thermal exposure in the dome 
volume to the 406-ft level (about 6 ft below the polar crane girder)^ partial 
thermal exposure in the volume between the 406- and 347-ft levels as indicated 
by the polar crane cable, and lack of damage to most thermally susceptible 
materials in the west quadrant of the reactor building; some evidence of 
thermal exposure Is seen in the free volume between the 305- and 347-ft levels. 
1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Ignition of the hydrogen-and-air mixture formed after the breach of the 
reactor coolant drain-tank rupture disk resulted in nominal thermal and 
overpressure damage to susceptible materials In all accessible regions of the 
reactor building. The initiation of burn and the subsequent termination of 
induced fires are indicated by data from a variety of pressure and temperature 
sensors located throughout the containment volume. The activation of the 
building spray system is defined by inflection and increase in the negative 
slope of interior-temperature-cooling and pressure-reduction curves. 
Estimates of hydrogen concentration [H] from maximum measured pressure 
indicate that [H] (in volume %) was <10%. Arguments based on exhaustive 
analysis of available data suggest that [H] was approximately 8%. At this 
concentration^ propagation of flame is possible upward and horizontally in 
quiescent conditions^ but not downward. However, turbulent conditions, 
established circulation patterns, and the ambient absolute humidity of the 
mixture can perturb propagation patterns in ways that are only qualitatively 
2 3 understood. » Assuming uniform mixing of the 8% mixture and induction of 
adequate turbulence in internal circulation flows, flame speeds up to 5 m/s 
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are possible--even in the presence of saturated steam environments. Given 
that no operational ignition sources are available in the reactor building 
above the 305-ft level, the time delay to achieve peak overpressure is 
consistent with an ignition location in the basement, especially in view of 
the basement water spillage and the frequent steam release from the reactor 
coolant drain-tank pressure-release system. 
Internal thermal damage to fine fuels* Indicates the general exposure to 
fire of all susceptible interior surfaces, with the exception of random items 
including fabric ties of unknown composition, 2 x 4 framing lumber on both the 
305-ft and 347-ft levels, and various polymeric materials. This lack of 
damage is apparent from photographic and video surveys and has been visually 
reconfirmed by various entry participants. This pattern is reported in 
* Fine fuel is defined as a flammable material with high surface-to-volume 
ratio. 
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several informal reports.* Subsequent entries showed more regions where there 
is burn damage, but no region where there is unexpected lack of thermal 
damage. Conjecture as to the reason for these undamaged items includes: 
• Preferential absorption of water from saturated atmosphere. Increasing 
the thermal exposure required to produce thermal damage. 
• Direct exposure to high-concentration steam and water vapor, resulting 
in the same effect. 
• Shielding from thermal radiation by position or geometric obscuration. 
• Shielding from the expanding flame front or convectively driven hot 
gases by physical obstruction. 
OVERPRESSURIZATION EVIDENCE IN AND AROUND 
THE ENCLOSED STAIRWELL AND ELEVATOR COMPLEX 
(NORTHEAST) ON BOTH THE 305-FT AND 347-FT LEVELS 
Damage to the elevator and stairwell doors indicates Internal 
pressurization of both the stairwell and the elevator. Moreover, the metal 
floor plate in front of the elevator door on the 305-ft level was displaced. 
On the 347-ft level to the east and west side of the enclosed elevator, 
barrels containing unknown levels of oil were distorted to various degrees. 
If the common enclosure for elevator and stairwell communicates directly 
to the basement, ignition of a near-lower-limit hydrogen-and-air mixture in 
this volume could produce a damaging pressure differential rate because the 
2 
containment volume is finite and adiabatic expansion is constrained. 
Movement of the floor plate on the 305-ft level is possible via pressure 
reaction from the elevator shaft. 
An alternative scenario to explain elevator door distortion is potential 
H-3 enrichment of the elevator and stairwell enclosure during H, production 
* Photographs of areas and items discussed in this "Introduction and 
Background" section are located in Refs. 5 and 6. 
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periods^ Lack of circulation paths could provide a reservoir for a higher-
concentration hydrogen-and-air mixture, which would produce a faster local 
pressure rise--overwhelming the venting capabilities of door gaps. 
A third possible pressurization potential results from a temperature rise 
caused by volumetric flame expansion throughout the reactor building, causing 
a general pressure increase. For most sites, this pressure rise would 
correlate directly to flame propagation duration and would equilibrate. 
However, in relatively tight volumes like the enclosed elevator, the rate of 
pressure rise may be faster than the venting capabilities of openings, causing 
the resulting damage. 
Damage to the barrels could be overpressure-related and different extents 
of damage could result from different levels of different contents. However, 
no other cabinets, tool boxes, dial faceSj or electrical boxes indicate 
unequilibrated pressure distortion in any areas photographed or reported by 
entry personnel. 
Another explanation for observed barrel damage Is to attribute distortion 
to rapid quenching of heated, slightly sealed volumes. Again, the content 
level and volatility would contribute to degree of distortioin. Here, 
relatively slow heating (duration 10-40 s) can allow gas in the barrel to 
escape through a poor seal. Upon rapid cooling (from exposure to containment 
spray systems), Interior gases experience pressure reduction. If cooling rate 
is rapid, inward gas leakage may be frustrated because of pressure enhancement 
of the seal, and when differential pressure is adequate, permanent distortion 
results. 
Without having the opportunity to closely examine either the subject 
barrels or the doors to the enclosed elevator and stairwell complex, 1t is 
impossible to unequivocally define the processes causing the observed damage. 
However, on the basis of location and appearance, 1t 1s likely that local and 
independent phenomena (within the total dynamics of hydrogen burn) were 
responsible for this pressure-related damage evidence. 
Most Items susceptible to thermal degradation on and above the 347-ft 
level suffered some photographically apparent thermal damage. On the 305-ft 
level evidence of burn damage was not extensive. Yet close scrutiny by 
personnel interested in such observations has found adequate charred and 
melted items to confirm the presence of a combustion front at most locations 
on this level. Insufficient photographic or video data is available to 
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confirm the presence of burn damage below the 305-ft level. However, this 
region contained most, if not all, of the active electrical circuits that 
could (either during normal operation or electrical shorting) provide adequate 
energy for ignition. Since electrical components in reactors are required to 
be intrinsically safe, it 1s likely that ignition resulted during arcing 
failure of an electrical apparatus component, probably in the basement. 
NEW WORK 
Past work in this project focused on identification of burn damage 
location and patterns at various levels and regions in the containment. The 
purpose for this assay was to define localized fire-flow patterns and 
intensity levels, if possible. Although photographic surveys of 
in-containment vistas, ensembles, items, and surfaces were abundant 
(approximately 600 photos from 29 entries), clarity of the burn detail in most 
photographs was not adequate for diagnostic purposes. However, the extent of 
thermal damage was defined (and is indicated In Figs. 1 through 5) as regions 
where thermally degraded materials were located, photographed, and, in some 
cases, extracted from the reactor building for further close examination. 
These figures show that thermal damage exists in the following areas: 
• The reactor building dome. 
• In most free-volume regions above the 347-ft level (except the 
southeast section). 
• In most free-volume regions-of the 305-ft level (except the northern 
and western seismic ring areas). 
Areas containing thermally susceptible materials that apparently do not 
exhibit thermal degradation are: 
• The 347-ft level--southeast to southwest along the D-ring. 
• The 305-ft level--the region of the equipment hatch and on the 
northern extent of the fuel storage pond at the containment wall. 
To obtain insight into conditions existing before and during the hydrogen 
burn, temperature records were surveyed from data recorded on a multipoint 
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temperature-measurement system. A summary of these data is presented in 
Table 1. Data were recorded progressively every 6 min; the times of the 
transient phenomena were assumed by extrapolation from temperature-change 
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data. However, good data prior to core uncovering show that lower-level 
temperatures averaged less than 100% (37.8°C), while dome temperatures 
were roughly 130°F (54.4°C). After core uncovering, temperature in 
basement areas increased rapidly while dome temperatures remained essentially 
constant. The cycles of these temperature data are correspondingly similar up 
to the time of the hydrogen burn. After the hydrogen burn, the dome 
temperature showed a substantial rise (as did the temperature inside the 
enclosed stairwell). Throughout this total period, the temperature at the 
primary reactor shield increased from 4°F to 10°F (2°C to 5°C), 
indicating little thermal or convective energy transfer near the exterior core 
volume. The average air temperature rise post hydrogen burn* Increased from 
&T = 3^F (17°C) In regions at or below the 305-ft level to AT = 
50°F (25°C) in regions of the dome. This is in direct correlation to both 
the extent and degree of thermal damage indicated by photographic evidence; 
i.e., larger free volume, longer flame duration, and fewer heat-loss surfaces 
contributed to higher average bulk air temperatures in the dome relative to 
other areas where constrained conditions provided ample heat-loss mechanisms. 
The same geometric heat-transfer effects should hold true during and after 
passage of a flame front, and corresponding thermal damage to materials should 
be complementary. 
Ignition of a uniformly distributed near-lower-limit mixture of hydrogen 
in air, spreading from basement ignition sources to the top of the reactor 
building dome by turbulent propagation modes, occurred in the time period 
defined by measured OTSG pressure gauges. The flame front would have been 
approximately 1 cm thick at an adiabatic flame temperature of about 1000 K. 
The exact paths of flame propagation are undefined. Because of the low 
hydrogen concentration, preferential flame spread was upward in quiescent 
atmosphere. However, air motion produced by reactor building coolers, 
steam/hydrogen release from the discharge duct of the reactor-coolant drain 
tank, and natural convection processes ensured that turbulent flow conditions 
existed which could greatly modify flame spread rates. The exit of the 
discharge duct is located near the west open stairway on the undersurface of 
* This is temperature rise computed at times just before and after the 
hydrogen burn. 
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the 305-ft plane. In Ref. 1, Henri and Postma conclude that the primary paths 
for entry of the reactor gas mixture to the total reactor building were 
through the open stairwell. How these gases from the discharge duct 
interacted with total ventilation patterns is not defined. This may be a moot 
point since, by the time ignition occurred, hydrogen in the reactor building 
was undoubtedly uniformly mixed. The ignition source responsible for 
initiation of the hydrogen burn is undefined. Several circuit boxes, 
instrument racks, meters, and controllers exist in various locations around 
D-shields and containment walls in the basement. The heights of these items 
above the basement floor are undefined. This knowledge is of interest since 
all electrical service is, by code, designed to be explosion-proof and a 
potential mode for failure of the circuit components may be by immersion in 
water. Another ignition source potential is related to the activities of 
plant operators to control core and reactor building conditions. Activation 
of valves, pumps, etc. in critical locations could produce ignition arcs from 
control components perturbed by thermal or mechanical effects of reactor 
9 
excursion. No obstructions around the inner perimeter of the reactor 
building block or blind the flow of gases outside of the D-shield. 
Approximately lOX of the cooled gases from the cooling system plenum (25,000 
ft /min) Is distributed to this area via committed ducting. The only exit 
paths for these gases are the seismic gap and the open stairwell. Thus, if 
ignition occurred from sources away from the open stairwell, the preferred 
flame propagation path would be upward through the seismic gap. Horizontal 
spread would occur, but at a slower rate, even during turbulent propagation 
conditions. As yet, identification of specific ignition sources is not 
possible from available documentation. However, ample evidence exists on the 
347-ft level to confirm flame propagation through the seismic gap regions. 
Figure 6 shows photographs of plywood on the reactor building south wall 
and remains of an instruction or maintenance manual located on the reactor 
building north wall, both ignited by fire propagation through the seismic 
gap. Note in Fig. 6a that wires along the wall also exhibit burn trauma. 
Figures 6c and 6d show the front and rear surface of the plywood panel after 
it was extracted from the reactor building. Both sides are charred, as are 
edges and holes through which wire ties penetrate. Surface char condition 
indicates that the panel ignited to flaming combustion for a short period 
before self-extinguishing or being quenched by the reactor spray system. 
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Regardless of the ignition source location, it is apparent that a 
hydrogen-and-air flame front traversed most of the reactor building volume 
above (and probably below) the 305-ft level. The duration of this propagation 
was about 12 s, and thermal exposure to combustible or thermally sensitive 
surfaces was sufficient to produce thermal damage and/or Ignition of these 
materials, especially in regions where the volume of the combustion plume was 
optically thick. 
The peak pressure rise of about 28 psi during the hydrogen burn indicates 
that the reaction took place in a mixture of about 8% hydrogen in air. The 
adiabatic temperature rise during combustion of an 8% hydrogen-in-air mixture 
is about 1000°K. Calculated exposure radiative and convective flux (q^) 
from optically thick combustion plumes 1s: 
2.2 ¥/cm^< q^ < 4.5 W/cm^ . 
This range is approximate since we assume values for combustion plume 
emittance {i) which may be in error. It is quite possible that t could be 
larger for optically thick hydrogen combustion plumes. 
EXAMINATION OF TMI MATERIALS 
To estimate the intensity of thermal exposure to damaged materials, it is 
necessary to examine their condition and determine their composition so that 
thermal damage patterns can be analyzed. Photographic evidence is inadequate 
for such appraisal. We requested the opportunity to examine materials removed 
from the reactor building and recommended removal of additional materials for 
analysis. To date, the following materials have been made available for our 
examination: 
* Appendix A outlines the calculation. 
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Level 305 Level 347 Polar Crane 
• Polypropylene • Plywood board • Fire extinguisher 
bucket 
• Wood from tool box • Polar crane pendant 
and control box 
• Two radiation signs 
• Hemp and polypropylene 
rope 
• Catalog remains 
• Telephone and 
associated wire 
These materials retain residual radioactive contamination. Consequently, all 
examination must be performed under rad-safe conditions. Moreover, chemical 
or physical analytical procedures can only be done on instruments that are 
contaminated, or can be easily decontaminated. We were unable to locate 
expendable diagnostic equipment; therefore, our examination of extracted 
materials was limited to detailed photography and macroscopic observations. 
THERMAL MEASUREMENTS ON EXEMPLAR MATERIALS 
To augment this analysis, we located examplar materials which are 
generically similar to those removed from the reactor building. Response 
properties of the exemplar materials were measured in a thermal gravimetric 
analyzer (TGA) to ascertain the temperature range of thermal degradation and 
weight-loss rates. Figures 7, 8, and 9 show TGA patterns for three of these 
materials: 
• NBS-ABS, a standard material used as a control for smoke tests. ABS 
is acrylonitrile butadiene styrene, similar to telephone body material 
• Electronics terminal material (ABS). 
• Red rubber fire hose. 
Thermograms are obtained by isothermally heating milligram-sized samples of 
materials, supported on a micro balance, at a constantly increasing 
temperature rate. Weight loss with temperature indicates thermal degradation 
mode and mechanism. Resulting data help identify the material and effects of 
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additives on thermal behavior. Also, the temperature range of maximum weight 
loss indicates critical conditions for producing potentially ignitable 
pyrolyzates. 
These figures are included to illustrate how different TGA records can be 
used to analyze performance of exposure materials. Figure 7 shows that 
NBS-ABS commences major weight loss at 370°C and terminates at 500°C. 
Most flammable pyrolyzates are emitted in this range, leaving about 20% inert 
material as residue. This material is flammable and, with an external 
ignition source, it will ignite within this range. Figure 8 shows two major 
weight-loss periods, the first occurring at 265°C and the second at 
36^C. This ABS formulation included bromine- and antimony-containing fire 
retardants that release upon pyrolysis to inhibit flaming combustion. 
Figure 9 illustrates the thermal degradation pattern for red rubber fire 
hose. This material begins slow degradation at 211°C, ultimately forming an 
inert char at 470°C. We would expect that this material would be difficult 
to ignite because of low pyrolyzate production. 
Table 2 collects TGA data for a variety of materials, some of which are 
similar to materials extracted from the reactor building. It shows the ranges 
of temperature required to produce substantial weight loss (and, consequently, 
pyrolyzate production) from materials. Polymers other than those removed from 
the reactor building are included because they represent the other kinds of 
items shown in photographs from the reactor building entry. Also included in 
Table 2 are the available thermal properties of these materials. 
The initial indication of weight loss in TGA generally results from water 
loss or surface processes. Occurrence of major weight loss from materials 
results in production of pyrolyzates and both the magnitude and the slope of 
weight loss indicate the degree of material-destruction processes. The 
temperature corresponding to the median of weight loss during the first major 
weight-loss experience can be used to estimate the condition where the rate of 
thermal destruction is maximum. At this condition it is likely that enough 
pyrolyzate is produced at the exposure surface to create an ignitable mixture 
in the boundary layer. 
Using standard solutions for transient heat conduction in semi-infinite 
solids with constant thermal properties, it is possible to calculate the time 
at which a material's surface will attain a specific temperature upon exposure 
to constant thermal flux levels. However, adjustments should be made to 
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account for re-radiation heat losses from exposure surfaces and latent heat 
processes required to produce pyrolyzates from polymers. With specific 
surface temperature, exposure heat flux, and defined thermal constants, the 
time required to reach this temperature is: 
(1) 
Here q. is total thermal exposure flux. Times calculated using this 
equation should be short relative to those for real materials, which 
experience both thermal and mass convection heat losses. To account for these 
losses, we adjust q. by subtracting from it the surface radiation energy at 
the specified critical surface temperature, and the mass convection losses 
(the product of surface mass loss rate and latent heat of pyrolysis). The 
resultant effective energy exposure rate q replaces q|̂  in Eq. (1), giving 
a longer time to attain the critical temperature level. Values for time 
obtained by using both q. and q in Eq. (1) bound the time range between 
exposure of an inert solid and a solid experiencing both re-radiation and 
latent heat losses. Appendix B outlines this procedure and Includes sample 
calculations for three material types known to be in the TMI-2 reactor 
building. Critical temperature for the three materials is estimated to be 
600 K, and thermal exposure energy is the high value calculated from 
convective radiative conditions during combustion of 8% hydrogen in air (q^ 
= 4.5 W/cm^). 
These materials and times to critical weight-loss conditions are: 




Times to attain critical temperature conditions in these materials are of 
the same order of duration as those recorded during the hydrogen burn in free 
volumes of the reactor building. Thus, all susceptible materials exposed to 


















POLAR CRANE PENDANT 
One item that possibly received the most Intense energy exposure was the 
pendant and festoon for the polar crane. Figures lOa and lOb show the lower 
polar crane pendant, and upper polar crane pendant and festoon along the A 
girder in the reactor building. Figures lOc and lOd, and all plates in 
Figs. 11, 12, and 13, show the relative thermal damage of cable sections 
extracted from the reactor building.* These are illustrative photographs 
starting from the festoon support of the polar crane and extending to the 
position of the control box resting on the east side of the west D-shield. A 
detailed description of thermal damage on each section is contained in 
Table 3. The figures and tables show that all sections received thermal 
exposure, including those coiled on the D-shield catwalk. The degree of 
thermal degradation decreased from the polar crane level to the D-shield top, 
and, in fact, was only apparent on the bottom pieces where cuts in insulation 
projected free surfaces of poor heat transfer. Thermal degradation is also 
apparent on light lenses of the pendant control box (Fig. 13c). 
Figure 14 plots thermal damage with pendant length from polar crane level 
to the top of the D-shield level. Superimposed 1s the level of B/Y 
radiation (as determined and constructed by Mr. Trujillo). Maximum thermal 
damage occurs in the region from 6 to 10 ft below the polar crane girder (from 
about the 420-ft level down to about the 406-ft level). This region shows 
locally high u/y activity, which may correlate to physical absorption by 
porous, charred Insulation. Thermal damage is severe and circumferentially 
equal in this region. Char depth on the polymer surface averages 1 to 2 mm. 
We have no clue as to the composition of the insulating cover for the pendant, 
so we cannot define the intensity of exposure. However, it was definitely 
intense and uniform, an indication that this region was bathed for a 
substantial period in an intense combustion zone. 
From the 406-ft level to the top of the D-shield (the 367-ft level), 
thermal damage is progressively less and becomes more directional; i.e., half 
* This examination was conducted at Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, in 
cooperation with Mr. Ralph Trujillo, Project Manager for the cable integrity 
project for TMI-2 reactor building electrical circuits. 
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of the insulation circumference exhibited a heavier degree of damage, ranging 
from char at the 406-ft level to no perceptible insulation degradation just 
above the D-shield plane. Unfortunately, the direction of exposure is not 
established, either by cable geometry or by observation. Because of the 
extent of thermal damage to available polymers in the south and southeast 
regions of the reactor building, it might be feasible to assume that plume 
dimensions encompassed that region. Moreover, since all containment gases 
above the 347-ft level were convected to the air-cooler intake plenums in the 
southern sector just below the 347-ft level, some preferential fire 
propagation path may have occurred in this area. However, because there were 
fewer thermally susceptible materials in the north reactor building regions we 
cannot contrast the south and north experience to define the center of fire 
intensity. Had there been either minimal thermal experience or other patterns 
in susceptible polymers in any other region, we may have had better 
opportunity to define fire plume geometry. Only one cause for asymmetry of 
the burn pattern below the 406-ft level can be conjectured: that the cable at 
this height was exposed to radiation and convection from a hydrogen plume 
centered to one side (logically the south side) of the reactor building. The 
exposed surface would sustain flame more readily from the shadowed surface, 
thus producing the observed pattern. 
Photographic documentation of thermal damage patterns sustained by items 
removed from the TMI-2 reactor building revealed a variety of responses from 
different materials located in the same general area; e.g., materials around 
the telephone on the south reactor building wall of the 347-ft level show 
quite a different response relative to material composition. 
HYDROGEN-FLAME-EXPOSURE TESTS 
Because thermal constants of most polymeric materials are defined only 
for virgin compounds, it is virtually impossible to calculate thermal response 
properties. However, simple hydrogen-fire-exposure tests may give an 
indication of accident exposure conditions. To assess this possibility, we 
conducted selected exposure tests on our exemplar materials using a Meker 
burner adjusted to a fully pre-mixed burning mode. Flow was adjusted to 
produce a measured flame temperature of 833% (note: during measurement, the 
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20-mil thermocouple was incandescent, so measured temperature was no doubt 
substantially lower than actual flame temperature). A simple-copper-slug 
calorimeter measurement of total thermal flux indicated an exposure flux of 
2 
6 W/cm . This level of flame temperature and thermal flux was close enough 
to projected TMI-2 accident measurements and estimated reactor exposure 
conditions, and resulting data trends should be similar to thermal response 
variations of materials that suffered hydrogen-flame exposure in the TMI-2 
reactor building. 
Figure 15 shows the simple experimental setup. In Figs. 16 through 24, 
materials subjected to the experimental fire are compared directly to similar 
materials extracted from the TMI-2 reactor building. Table 4 gives details of 
the experimental exposure and descriptions of thermal damage to exposed 
samples. 
Figures 17 through 21 illustrate the correlation between the damage to 
exemplar and TMI materials of the south-wall telephone stand on the 347-ft 
level. The similarity of thermal damage is encouraging and the duration and 
intensity of thermal exposure is in the range of estimated thermal fluxes 
attained during the reactor building burn. Note that these are very 
simplistic tests. No attempt was made to refine temperature or thermal energy 
measurement. Moreover, we had no illusions as to the distribution of 
convective or radiative contribution from the test burner. However, the 
results give data trends which are intuitively acceptable. Description of 
other materials' responses are contained in Table 4. 
CONCLUSIONS 
On the basis of 
• Photographic and video surveys of the TMI-2 reactor building 
interior, 
• Visual and photographic analysis of materials extracted from the 
reactor building, 
• Macro- and micro-experiments with materials of composition 
generically similar to that of extracted TMI samples, and 
• Calculations using proposed physical conditions and assumed material 
properties. 
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the following conclusions are posed: 
1. Hydrogen concentration in the reactor building prior to burn was 
confirmed to be about 8%, as calculated by analyzers of TMI-2 
pressure and temperature records. 
2. No defined path for hydrogen propagation has been established. 
3. Over-pressurization events in the enclosed elevator-and-stairwell 
complex may be independent of the overall hydrogen-fire-propagation 
dynamics. 
4. The most probable ignition site for the hydrogen burn was in the 
basement volume; radial location is not defined. 
5. Thermal degradation of most susceptible materials on all levels is 
consistent with direct flame contact from hydrogen fire. 
6. Polar-crane-pendant thermal damage Indicates Intense exposure to a 
hydrogen-fire plume. 
7. The directional character of damage to lower pendant lengths 
suggests potential geometric limitation of the hydrogen-fire plume. 
8. The total burn pattern of the plywood board back for the south-wall 
telephone on the 347-ft level indicates flame propagation through 
the seismic gap. 
9. Lack of thermal degradation of random, thermally susceptible 
materials may result from preferential moisture absorption. Because 
of the random nature of this evidence, it is not likely that 
undamaged materials resulted from selective shadowing. 
10. Burn patterns in the reactor building indicate that the dome region 
above the 406-ft level was uniformly exposed to direct hydrogen 
flame, the region between the 406-ft level and the top of the 
D-shield was partially exposed to hydrogen flame (most likely in the 
south and east quadrants), and the damage on the 305-ft level was 
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1 joule = lO^erg 
1 joule/sec = watt 
Appendix A 
CALCULATION FOR RADIANT EXPOSURE ENERGY 
Assume: Tmax = 1400OF ('\-1000OK) 
Qj, = zGT 0. 2< E <0.8 
z = 5.665 X 10"5 erg/cm^ec ^ ^ 
T4 = iol%o4 
ET4 = 5.7 x lO^erg/sec cm^ 
2 Q = 5 . 7 watt/cm 
^(£=1) 
2 
^ = 4 . 6 watt/cm 
''(£=0.8) 
q = 1 . 1 watt/cm 
''^(1=0.2) 
Since only emission during H2 combustion in OH and H2O bands for opt ical ly 
thick water vapor at lOOOOK j < 0 .5* 
T. < O.&i-t 
G = 2.85 watt/cm^ 
'^(i;=0.5) 
* Eckert, Introduction to Heat and Mass Transfer, p. 243. 
t Giedt, Principles of EngineeringTIeat TransfeF, p. 265. 
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CALCULATION FOR CONVECTIVE HEAT TRANSFER COEFFICIENT (h) RANGE 
Use properties of Hot Air: T -̂  1000%, Jg^mb = 311°K 
Velocity Range: 10 ft/sec < U » < 40 ft/s 
Assume 1 = 1.0 ft^ 
'sec 
2 
1/3 U» ^^^ K = 3.9 x 10 ^ BTU 
h = 0.664 • K • Pr . - — ¥r f t Fo 
— - — v l Pr = 0.702 
(P r ) l / 3 ^ Q^gg 
V = 126.8 x 10'"^ ^ ^ sec 
U = 10 f t / sec 
fi = 1.16 x 10"^ watt/cm^ \ 
^ = RA (T -T ) s " 
^^ =0 .8 watt/cm^ 
U = 40 f t / sec 
fi = 2.33 X 10"^ watt/cm^ °K 
q = RA ( T - T ^ ) s «• 
2 C = 1.6 watt/cm 
RANGE OF THERMAL FLUX BASED ON 8% HYDROGEN 
Qj = ^j, + ^j.(min) 1.4 + 0.8-v 2.2 watt/cm^ 
% = \ + <1̂ (max) 2.85 + 1.6 -̂  4.45 watt/cm^ 
(Experimentally determined thermal flux from small premixed source, 
q measured; Meeker burner = 6 watt/cm2) 
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Appendix B 
TIME ESTMATE FOR CRITICAL TEMPERATURE RISE 
Temperature d is t r ibu t ion in panel exposed to external heat flux described by: 
, , . aT „ 3^T 
Assume heat loss from surface dependent on surface temperature, then, surface 
boundary condition is: 
3 T ~K TZ "" Exposure Flux 
s ^ y 
(0,t) 
Assuming constant solid thermal parameters and temperature rise at irradative 
surface (y = 0); 
Simplified solution to equation 1 is: 
solve for t: 
This form gives estimate of time for specific temperature rise in inert solid 
before temperature rise reaches back surface. 
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ACCOUNT FOR HEAT LOSS DUE TO RE-RADIATION 
FROM SURFACE AND LATENT HEAT PROCESS 
Approximate surface temperature for production of ignitable pyrolyzates is 
600°K. Thus, for most pessimistic case for reradlation losses: 
, watt 
q^r = 21^ = 0.74 1 
cm 
Latent heat to convert solid to gas and critical mass flux at mean temperature 
of maximum weight loss for materials in table 2 (about 600°K) are of order 
2kW/gm and 2 x lO'^gm/cm^ sec respectively;* therefore, heat lost due to 
latent heat processes is: 
^ = 2 x l 0 5 ^ ^ ^ x 2x10""^^-^^ 
^1^*^ g"' cm̂ sec 
ft =04 watt 
(̂lat) ^'^ZjT cm 
Thus, maximum heat loss from surface at critical mass loss flux temperature is: 
\r * ̂ lat " °̂ ^̂  •" ^'^ = 1 . 1 4 ^ 
cm 
* A. Tewarson, Physico-chemical and Combustion Pyrolysis Products of 
Polymeric Materials, National Bureau of Standards, Washington, DC, 
NBS-GCR-80-295 (1980). 
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TIME TO RAISE SURFACE TEMPERATURE TO CRITICAL MASS PRODUCTION LEVEL 
PVC~Gener1c 
^r^V 
^ p = 1.2 gm/cm^ 
K pCp 
joule_ C„ = 1.4 
P gm.°K 
r 14.6 X lO^^joule * i = ^2^0 sec 
^ ~ 2 0̂  ( iner t sol id) 
cm sec K ^ 
AT^ = 6 2 3 \ - 300 = 3 2 3 \ S " ^^*^ ^^^ 
^ (Include losses) 
q_. = 4.45 joule/cm 
Pine Wood 
3 
p = 0.34 gm/cm 
. , t . = 5.3 sec 
t - K 4 _ _ ( iner t sol id) 
qm ^ K 
. t . = 9.4 sec 
K = M X 10 joule ^.^^^^^^ ^^^^g^j 
cm sec K 
ATJ = 3 23°K 
2 qy = 4.45 joule/cm " sec 
PMMA (Acry l ic ) 
3 p =1 .17 gm/cm 
. , t . = 40.0 sec 
r - 1 •) jou le 1 
L - K j _ _ ( Ine r t so l id ) 
•̂  gm • K ^ 
. t . = 68.0 sec 
K = . . 2 0 x l 0 _ j o u l e ^ .^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ 
cm sec K° 
A T J = 3 23°K 
2 q.j. = 4.45 joule/cm ' sec 
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Pre-burn change relative Post-burn Post-burn 
background to pre-steam air bulk temp 
temperature release temperature rise 
































A-16 AH-TE-5088: 100 
Southeast 
stairwell 
(R-18A), 310 ft 
A-1 AH-TE-5010: 91 
Sump pump, 282 ft 
A-2 AH-TE-5011: 
Let-down cooler 

























drain tank, 282 ft 
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Ambient Time of Initial resulting Time mark 
temp prior incident temperature from steam just Next 
to 0400 (steam rise release before time 
March 28 release) [°f) {"¥) ignition mark 
Pre-burn air 
temperature 
Pre-burn change relative Post-burn 
background to pre-steam air 
temperature release temperature 







hatch, 305 ft 


















127 0447 128 01 345 
Average: 40.3 
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ash at ̂ C 
0 at 550 
0 at 650 
4.0 at 500 
9.0 at 700 
0 at 750 
41 at 850 
0 at 650 
0 at 550 
0 at 650 
0 at 650 
0 at 600 
1.1 at 600 
4.5 at 650 
9.2 at 650 
































Table 2. (Continued.) 
Sample 
Temperature First major 
at initial weight-loss 




% Sample wt-loss stage Meight % 










240 299-434 83.5 366 0.5 at 550 3.5-4 0.89-0.91 
Polyethylene wire 220 
jacket 









0 at 550 
0 at 550 
0.91-1.4 0.55 
Exemplar material. 
Table 3. Thermal damage to sections of the polar crane pendant. 
Section Length Damage 
No. (in.) 
31 20 North side ash, plastic tape char all around^ no 
degradation under tape 
Half circumference char, half ash (ash grey^ char black) 
Low end complete char for 15 in,^ 180° char/ash to top* 
Char complete circumference 
Circumferential char for total lengthy depth %l-2 mm 
Circumferential char for total length 
Circumferential char for total length 
Circumferential char, marked side ash for top 15 in., 2/3 
ash and 1/3 char on bottom end 
Char 1200 for top 20 in., ash 25^ (marked side) 
180° ash on marked side—slight thermal damage on 
remaining circumference 
120° ash on marked side—slight damage 
Same as No. 21 
180°char and 180° ash for top 21.5 in.s extraneous 
char on low end, extraneous deposited material -vS" long 
starting at 6 in. from low end and twisting up to char 
18 31 Ash opposite marked side, but little thermal damage on 
unmarked side 
17 30 Same as No. 18 
16 29 Same as No. 18 
15 29-1/2 120° light ash on total length of section, opposite 
marked side 
14 30-1/2 Same as No. 15 


























Table 3. (continued) 
Section Length Damage 
No. (1n.) 
12 29 No clear ash or thermal damage 
11 31-1/2 No char^ no ash except for char on deposited material, 
drips, etc. 
10 30 Same as No. 11 
09 29-1/2 No char, no ash; first pliable piece 
08 30 No char or ash on surface, two cuts exhibit char on inside 
surface and inner conductors, flexible 9-10.5 in. from low 
end 
07 31-1/2 One cut 3-1/2 in. from low end, tip charred, no apparent 
inner degradation 
06 30 Flexible, no char, no ash 
03 to 05 94 Splice and insulation checks and cuts 
01 to 02 56 Circumferential burn pattern from tape or paper wrapped 
around piece 8-10 in. from No. 2 end 
3 Degrees refer to portion of circumference of cable. 
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Melted at ends, waxy 
More melting at ends than test 1, 
some blending of materials 
Melting at point of contact, 
breakage occurred at 27 s into 
test with moderate pulling force 
applied 
More melting than test IB, 
breakage occurred at 33 s into 
test with very little force applied 
Melting, fusing of jacket, 
conductors exposed, bubbling of 
clear plastic plug 
More melting of jacket than test 
2, char formation, signs of 
dripping, conductors exposed and 
ignited at 29 s into test 
Melting at edges, some bubbling 
Melting at edges, incipient 
bubbling 
(Material placed on screen to 
prevent dripping onto burner)? 
Melted into screen, bubbling 
(Inadvertent flame temp, decrease 
approx. 30-40OC)° Bubbling. 
(Inadvertent flame temp, decrease 
approx. 30-40OC): More bubbling 
than 4A 
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Melting, charring along edge of 
cable, bubbling and deformation of 
clear plastic plug 
More charring and melting than In 
test 5—ignited approximately 18 s 
into test 
Some charring along edges of 
plywood 
More charring than in test 6, 
minimal burning through top lamina 
More charring of top surfaces, 
outer edges and corners; splitting 
of top layer 
Extreme charring of top surface 
and sides, ashy appearance at 
corners 
No noticeable change 
Slight char along one edge 
Charring approximately like test 6B 
Loss of strength, bubbling, slight 
char, deformation 
More bubbling, deformation, 
blackening of approx. 74^ of 
surface area 
More bubbling, melted edges, 
melted into screen, brownish color 
over surface 
Bubbling, melted edges, melted 
into screen, brownish color over 
surface 
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12B 20 120 
12C 12.5 75 
120 9.5 57 
12E 13 78 
Widespread bubbling, penetration 
through top (silver) layer 
More bubbling than in test 9, 
penetration through top layer 
More bubbling, charring, melting 
of adhesive, penetration through 
top layer 
(Plywood covered with single layer 
of polyethylene one side only): PE 
burned completely away, charring 
on two opposite edges 
(Plywood covered with a double 
layer of PE on one side only): 25t 
of PE lost due to drippage and 
shrinkage, charring along edges of 
plywood 
(Double layer of PE on one side of 
plywood): PE burned completely 
away, charring at edges and 
corners of plywood; PE ignited at 
15 s into test, and one edge of 
the plywood ignited also 
(Wood placed in PE bag): Bag 
burned away at approximately 7 s; 
noticeable color change in wood at 
approximately 12.5 s 
(Plywood placed in PE bag): Bag 
burned away approximately 6 s into 
test; noticeable color change in 
plywood at approximately 9.5 s 
(Plywood placed in PE bag): Bag 
burned away approximately 6 s into 
test; noticeable color change in 
plywood at approximately 13 s 
(this plywood was a darker piece 
than used In tes': 12D) 
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Results of exposure 
Loss of strength, some wrinkling 
Leathered appearance, bubbling 
More bubbling; otherwise same as 
lOA 
No noticeable change 
No noticeable change 
Some discoloration 
Charring, slight deformation, 
melting of outer covering 
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Figure 5. Thermal damage and potential overpressure on the 305-ft level 
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(a) (b) 
00 . , _ 
' ' "iiV 
(c) (d) 
Figure 6. Hydrogen-burned in-containment mater ials: (a) Bell telephone, (b) Charred manual on e lec t r i ca l 
box. (c) Back of plywood panel, (d) Front of plywood panel. 
•5 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
Temperature ramp — ^ ^ ^ 
NBS-ABS 0-1000°C full scale 
20° min 5.03 mg 
%Q mmfmln Air atmosphere 
0-100% full scale 1-7-83 iS.PJ 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
U ^ ^ ^ 3 7 0 ' C 
1 y— Sample weight 
1 X loss 
A ^ 
\ ^ ^ 
\ / — 500"C 
^ — . 
\ . 9% ash at 700" C 
1 1 1^^—4-^«J__ 
Time 
Figure 7. Thermogrdm of NBS-ABS. 
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J 1 1 1 
\ ^ 
^ - - ^ ^ ^ 
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10 mm/min chart 
0-100% full scale 
0-1000''C full sol® 
6.66 mg 
Air atmosphere 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
^-— 265' C 
1 ^ — Sample weight 
l -^-""^ loss 
^ X . ^ v \ „ . „ -—- 365'"C 




\ 4% ash 
\ 600°C 
Time-
Figure 8. Thermogrdin of instrument-case ABS. 
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Figure 10. In-containment views and sectional pieces of the polar crane pendant: (a) Jib crane; D-ring A 
is in lower right, (b) Girder A of the polar crane, (c) North side of cable is ash; plastic tape is 
charred all around;-no degradation under the tape, (d) Half of circumference is ash, half char (ash is 




^ i " 
Figure 11. Sections from the top part of the polar crane pendant: (a) Low end is complete char; remainder 
is one side char, one side ash. (b) Cables 31-26; the higher the cable number, the higher it was on the 
polar crane pendant, (c) Char around complete circumference, (d) Cables 25-17. 
-p. 
{^) 
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Figure 12. Sections from the bottom part of the polar crane pendant: (a) Cables 16-8. (b) Reverse sides 
of cables in (a), (c) Lengths 3-5, showing insulation cuts and checks, (d) Lengths 8-9, showing charred 
cut. 
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F igure 14. D i s t r i b u t i o n o f r es i dua l r a d i a t i o n and burn damage along pendant 




Figure 15. Small-scale materials and test apparatus for TMI exemplar materials. Hydrogen 
flame output was 6 W. 
*ia 
4S. 
Figure 16. Comparison of exemplar polyethylene rope exposed to 180 J/cm for 30 s (left) and TMI-? 







Figure 17. Comparison of exemplars exposed to 180 J/cm for 30 s and TMI materials: (a) Exemplar 
telephone receiver cord, (b) TMI receiver cord, (c) Exemplar extension cord, (d) TMI extension cord. 
Figure 18. Comparison of exemplar acrylic exposed to 180 J/cm for 30 s (left) and TMI-2 telephone dial 
en 
O 
Figure 19. Comparison of exemplar 
2 plywood (fir) exposed to 180 J/cm 
for 30 s (left̂  and plywood from TMI. 
Figure 20. Comparison of exemplar duct 
tape exposed to 120 J/cm^ for 20 s (left) 




Figure 21. Comparison of exemplar telephone body pieces and TMI-2 ABS telephone body: (a) Exemplar 
exposed to 120 J/cm for 20 s. (b) Telephone from TMI. (c) Exemplar exposed to 72 J/cm^ for 12 s. (d) 
Telephone from TMI. 




Figure 22. Comparison of exemplars and TMI-2 
polyethylene-wrapped plywood: (a) Exemplar 
exposed to 75 J/cm for 12.5 s. (b) Exemplar 









Figure 23. Comparison of exemplar wet plywood and TMI-2 wet plywood: (a) Exemplar exposed to 180 
J/cm for 30 s. (b) Exemplar exposed to 360 J/cm^ for 1 min. (c) Plywood-framed cage at TMI. 
tn 
Figure 24. Exemplar red rubber fire hose exposed to 360 J/cm^ for 1 min (left) and fire hose at TMI 
(right). 



